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The paper concentrates on the possibility of indirect harmonization of compensation  
awarded for the infringement of the rights protected by the EC law. Within the lit-
erature the problem of the influence of the European monetary integration upon the  
legal harmonization has not been analyzed so far. In the present paper the theory of  
transactional  framework (Calabresi & Melamed 1972, Ayres 2005) has been ap-
plied in order to analyze the potential economic consequences of the operation of the  
multilevel judicial governance structure which has been created in the European  
Union. The functional framework of the multilevel European judicial governance  
(Maduro, 2003; Petersmann, 2008) is thus to be analyzed from the perspective of  
the economic consequences of the European monetary integration (Rogoff, 1996;  
Rose, 2000). 
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1. THE PROBLEM
It is commonly agreed that monetary union membership should lead to har-
monization of prices in the member states.1 Additionally,  it  also may in-
crease a number of transactions and volume of trade. The question arises 
* This  paper  has  been  prepared  with  the  financial  support  of  the  Foundation  for  Polish
Science.
1 Rogoff,  K. (1996). The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle,  Journal of Economic Literature,  34, 
p. 647-668, Rose, A. (2000). One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Cur-
rencies on Trade, Economic Policy, 30, p. 7-33.
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whether monetary union may also lead to harmonization of compensations 
awarded by courts in the member states. According to R. Coase commodit-
ies  should  be  defined  as  bunches  of  rights  transferred  between parties.2 
These  transfers  may  be  either  voluntary  or  involuntary.  Involuntary  ex-
changes of rights for a given sum of money take the form of compensations 
awarded by courts within a framework of judicial governance. This model 
has  been  extended by  G.  Calabresi  and D.  Melamed who  proposed  the 
concept of transactional framework.3 The authors distinguished three differ-
ent types of legal rules:  protection oriented property rules, compensation 
oriented liability rules, and inalienability rules intended to deter both po-
tential parties from transfer of the entitlement. Whereas property rules pro-
mote  voluntary  exchanges,  liability  rules  enable  involuntary  transfers  in 
case of high transaction costs. Those involuntary transfers play an import-
ant role in case of takings and expropriations by the member states as well 
as in a wider area of tort liability. Such form of judicial governance creates a 
feasible alternative to the market transactions. Taking into accountthat the 
application of liability rules could maximize the number of transfers and the 
efficiency of allocation, judicial governance plays an increasingly significant 
economic role.4 Against that background judicial governance could be un-
derstood as the capacity of the court to engage in regulatory decisions.5
The allocative function of judicial  governance has been scrutinized by 
some institutions of the European Union. This issue has specifically been 
analyzed in  two documents  prepared by the European Commission:  the 
Green  Paper  –  Damages  actions  for  breach  of  the  EC  antitrust  rules 
COM/2005/0672 and the Commission Staff Working Paper SEC/2005/1732. 
Both documents emphasize “total underdevelopment” and an “astonishing 
diversity”  in  the  approaches  taken  by  the  Member  States  as  far  as  the 
private enforcement through damages claims in Europe is concerned. As a 
response to those deficiencies the European Commission has adopted the 
White Paper on  Damages Actions for  Breach of  the  EC antitrust  rules COM 
(2008) 165, having been published on 02.04.2008. The model proposed by 
the Commission is primarily focused on compensation through single dam-
ages  for  the  harm  suffered.  Additionally,  the  White  Paper  encapsulates 
some recommendations  concerning collective  redress,  disclosure  of  evid-
2 Coase, R.H. (1988).  The Firm, The Market and the Law, Chicago and London, Chicago Uni-
versity Press, p. 155.
3 Calabresi, G., & Melamed, A. D. (1972). Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral. Harvard Law Review, 85, p. 1089-1128.
4 Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S. (1996). Property Rules versus Liability Rules, Harvard Law Review  
109, 713-790.
5 Stone Sweet.  A.  (1999).  Judicialization and the Construction of Governance.  Comparative  
Political Studies 31, 147-184.
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ence  and  the  effect  of  final  decisions  of  competition  authorities  in  sub-
sequent damages actions. Those recommendations are intended to balance 
rights and obligations of the claimant and the defendant. Moreover, some 
safeguards  against  abuses  of  litigation  are  also  taken  into  account.  The 
Commission proposes to build stronger procedural framework for litigation 
and claims for compensation in case of infringement of the EC law. Those 
means are believed to broaden the access to judicial system and to enhance 
the quality of judicial governance. They are however not sufficient as far as 
the assessment of damages and the principle of equality in different Mem-
ber States are concerned.  The question arises,  whether  and under which 
conditions  harmonization  of  prices  resulting  from  monetary  integration 
may also affect the amount of compensations awarded by courts in case of 
state liability for damages.
2. THE STANDARDIZATION OF LIABILITY
RULES IN THE EC LAW AS A PRECONDITION
OF HARMONIZATION OF COMPENSATION
The judicial activity of domestic courts encapsulates the strategy of national 
judges adopted within a framework of the wider multilevel judicial gov-
ernance.6 This complex judicial governance structure can be characterized 
by the capacity of the court to engage in regulatory decisions.7 The model of 
multilevel judicial governance is thus based on the assumption that judges 
could directly influence both allocative and distributive consequences due 
to the process of proportionality analysis based on the so called balancing of 
the conflicting rights and principles.8 This approach seems to be typical for 
the recent development of the judicial  governance.9 In the context of the 
European Union such judicial governance structure is based on the coopera-
tion between national courts in member states and the ECJ.10 The form of ju-
dicial governance strategy varies depending on the complexity of a given 
6 Petersmann,  E-U. (2008).  Judging judges:  from ‘principal-agent theory’  to  ‘constitutional 
justice’ in multilevel ‘judicial governance’ of economic cooperation among citizens, Journal  
of International Economic Law, 11, p. 827-830.
7 Stone Sweet.  A.  (1999).  Judicialization and the Construction of  Governance.  Comparative  
Political  Studies 31:  147-184;  Stone Sweet.  A.  (2000).  Governing  with  Judges:  Constitutional  
Politics in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford;  Hirshl, R. (2004).  Towards Juristocracy:  
The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press, Cam. 
Mass, passim.
8 Stone Sweet. A. (2000).  Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford,  passim,  Hirshl, R. (2004).  Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Con-
sequences of the New Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press, Cam. Mass, p. 22-38.
9 Hirshl, R. (2004). Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutional-
ism,  Harvard University  Press,  Cam.  Mass,  pp.  12-18;  Petersmann,  E-U.  (2008).  Judging 
judges: from ‘principal-agent theory’ to ‘constitutional justice’ in multilevel ‘judicial gov-
ernance’ of economic cooperation among citizens, Journal of International Economic Law, 11, 
p. 827-831.
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case and the probability of correct application of the EC law and its costs. 
This assumption could be derived from the normative standard adopted by 
the ECJ in the Case C-283/81 CILFIT Srl i Lanificio Galardo SpA v. Ministry of  
Health [1982]. In this case the ECJ proposed the principle according to which 
domestic court is obliged to examine whether the application of the Com-
munity law is  so obvious as not  to  create any doubts (‘acte claire’).  The 
Court suggested that the examination of the EC law by the domestic courts 
should take into account the fact of the existence of many equivalent lin-
guistic versions and should compare them. Additionally, according to the 
ECJ domestic court should establish the meaning of legal terms used in the 
Community law. Moreover, the court should perform an integral interpreta-
tion of the norms of the Community law in a proper context, in relation to 
the aims realized by the Community law, in the light of the dynamism of 
the integration, and also taking into account a specific stage of integration in 
a particular moment of law-application. Hence domestic court should per-
form a deep analysis of a given norm, taking into account also some pos-
sible  interpretative  divergences  within  the Community.  Before passing  a 
judgement or before passing a preliminary ruling the court should examine 
thoroughly and interpret properly the norms of the Community law as well 
as adjudication of the ECJ (according to the doctrine of ‘acte eclaire’). This 
possibility is also used in case when the domestic court first passes and then 
withdraws preliminary question to the ECJ.
Concurringly, let  SC denote the social cost of judicial ruling, including: 
the costs of prolonged proceedings (delays) denoted as Cd, the costs of de-
tailed analysis of the Community law denoted as Ci, the cost of judicial error 
denoted as Ce. The economic aim of the process of application of law is min-
imization of the total costs of the application of law, which include the ad-
ministrative  costs  as  well  as  the  costs  of  judicial  mistakes: 
min SC= Cd + Ci + Ce
The level of costs of judicial errors should equal the sum of loss resulting 
from the  improper  application  of  the  Community  law.  Therefore,  when 
a domestic court makes a mistake in the process of application of the Com-
munity law this may result (but not always should result) with the necessity 
of paying by a Member State compensation D. The amount of compensation 
will be dependent upon the regime of state liability accepted on the level of 
the Community law. Under the assumption of full compensation from the 
court’s budget under strict  liability rule the sum of loss  Ce = D.  This loss 
10 Maduro, M. (2003). Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action. [in:] 
Walker  N.  (Ed.).  Sovereignty  in  Transition,  Hart  Publishing,  Oxford,  p.  21-25,  Komárek J 
(2007), European constitutionalism and the European arrest warrant: In search of the limits 
of contrapunctual principles, Common Market Law Rev. 44, p 30-39 (2007). 
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might but not necessarily has to be covered. It depends on the standard of 
liability for judicial error. On the other hand the cost of judicial error for 
a given court additionally depends on the link between the potential com-
pensation and the court. The problem of potential distortion of judges’ be-
haviour in case liability for judicial error has already been signalled in law 
and economics literature.11 It has been suggested that the liability for judi-
cial error should be placed on a state agency relatively far from the court. 
This would minimize  potential  distortions of judges’ behavior at  least in 
criminal cases. The EC cases have different characteristics and the potential 
liability would not result with the jeopardy for judicial independence. If op-
timal it would rather strengthen the rule of law, since  the effectiveness of 
the EC law depends on the character of incentives influencing judges’ beha-
viour. The strength of this ‘incentive effect’ is to be reflected by the γ para-
meter. The value of the parameter varies between 0 to 1. Under γ=1 we as-
sume the full compensation under strict liability rule with the assumption 
that the liability for judicial error is effectively placed on the court. 
Let  α be the probability that the correct decision taken by the domestic 
court is mistakenly taken by that court to be prima facie improper (type 1 er-
ror). Let  β be the probability that the erroneous decision taken by the do-
mestic court is mistakenly taken by that court to be proper (type 2 error). 
This later error results with the ruling set up independently by the national 
court. Type 2 error can only be detected by other national court which su-
pervises the decision on basis of breach of the EC law or by the European 
Commission monitoring the application of the EC law in Member States. 
Every case is  linked to some level of probability  p  that it  may be solved 
properly by domestic  court  where  p  has a given function of density  f(p) 
(probability density function). 
The complexity of every potential case has a contingent and exogenous 
character. The court may engage in three potential actions: a) pass a prelim-
inary question b) pass an ‘independent ruling’, c) examine the state of af-
fairs using the criteria developed by the ECJ.
a) The first  option is  linked to the preliminary question:  the domestic 
court may ask the ECJ without examination whether in a given case there is 
a necessity to pass the question according to the rule accepted in case 283/81 
CILFIT Srl i Lanificio Galardo SpA v. Ministry of Health [1982]. This strategy 
may be described as costly and strong standardization of application of the 
EC law. Let V1 denote the total value of the case under the strategy of costly 
and strong standardization of application of the EC law.
11 Fon, V., & Schaefer H.-B. (2007).  State Liability for Wrongful Conviction: Incentive Effects on 
Crime Levels, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=942691.
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b) Domestic court may pass the ruling in a way which is not consistent 
with the assumptions of the doctrine of ‘acte claire’, hence not taking into 
account the specific features of the Community law. Such an action may be 
regarded as a rational one, only under the assumption that the court is min-
imizing  the  costs  of  the  application  of  the  Community  law  Ci.  Such 
a strategy  of  domestic  courts’  action,  which  in  a  way  ignores  the  Com-
munity law, may be described as cheap and weak standardization of applic-
ation of the EC law. Consecutively let V2 be the total value of the case under 
the strategy of cheap and weak standardization of application of the EC 
law.
c) The domestic court may examine whether in a given case there is a ne-
cessity of passing a preliminary question. In this case it is the national court 
who bears the cost Ci. Finally let V3 denote the total value of the case under 
the strategy of the optimal standardization of application of the EC law.
According  to  the  assumption,  broadly  accepted  within  the  economic 
analysis  of  law,  individuals  tend to maximize  their  utility.12 This  funda-
mental assumption in regard to the economic analysis of state liability for 
the breach of the EC law by national courts means that judges also tend to 
the maximize their satisfaction  Uj – they behave as if  they were ‘rational 
utility  maximizers’.  This  activity  of  judges  results  in  the  increase  of  the 
number of correct decisions, therefore in the maximization of the number of 
judgments or rulings that would not be reversed in the appeal proceedings, 
so they would not result in diminishing of the courts’ prestige and in ex-
cessive costs of litigation.13 Maximization of utility by judges results with 
their inclination to force their own preferences through the increase of influ-
ence of judicial decisions, broadening the scope of their factual competences 
as well as maximization of given decisions (by creating the whole lines of 
cases). The judges’ motive may be described as the tendency towards the 
maximization of the value of the case.14 The attempts to describe in a more 
precise characteristics the judges’ behaviour, and in particular their prefer-
ences, lead to the conclusion that judges tend to minimize the number of re-
vised or annulled decisions, to minimize arrears linked to the examination 
of cases (particularly within the context of the requirement of case examina-
12 Becker, G .S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, p. 14.
13 Chalmers, D. (1997). Judicial Preferences and the Community Legal Order, The Modern Law 
Review, 60, 164-199.
14 Posner, R.A. (1973). An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion. Journal of Legal Studies, 2, p. 399 ; Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (1980). Legal Change, 
Judicial Behavior and the Diversity Jurisdiction, Journal of Legal Studies, 9, p. 367.
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tion in reasonable time) and to minimize the costs linked to setting out a 
single judgement.15 
The judges objective function may be thus characterized in the following 
way: let V be the value of a case. It is assumed that judges tend to maximize 
this value: Uj = max V. In case of a proper decision these benefits have a pos-
itive value  V >0, while in case of a wrong decision (judicial mistake) they 
take a negative value V <0. The court tends to maximize expected benefits 
stemming from the ruling (V) taking into account the existing standard of li-
ability in case of a breach of the Community law. The court maximizes be-
nefit as a result of verdicts consistent with the Community law, while the 
passing of a judgement with mistakes results in state liability. Therefore, the 
expected value  of  each  case  solved by the  domestic  court  (V1,  V2,  V3)  is 
a function of standard liability, probability that the passed verdict is a prop-
er one, and actions of the court such as passing judgments, asking a prelim-
inary  question or  making detailed examination  of a  case from the Com-
munity law perspective. The model of domestic courts’ action is based on 
the estimation of expected benefits (gains) or costs of every of the above-
mentioned strategies, taking into account various probabilities linked to dif-
ferent factors in the process of delimiting the sphere of probability, where 
the court will  choose a given path. Therefore the total values of a given 
cases under those strategies are following:
a) When domestic court asks a preliminary question to the ECJ, without 
performing detailed examination, (costly and strong standardization of ap-
plication of the EC law ), then:
V1 = pv – Cd – Ci,
where Cd > 0, Ci = 0, p = 1, then V1= v – Cd (I)
We assume that in case of asking a preliminary question the potential bene-
fits of solving the case as well as the costs of prolonged litigation balance 
each other, V1= Cd
and hence: V1 = 0.
b) When domestic court passes a judgement independently, without per-
forming detailed examination of the EC law (cheap and weak standardiza-
tion of application of EC law), then:
V2 = pv – (1 – p)γD (II)
15 Higgins, R.A., & Rubin, P. H. (1980). Judicial Discretion.  Journal of Legal Studies, 9, p. 129 ; 
Greenberg, P.E., & Haley, J.A. (1986). The Role of the Compensation Structure in Enhancing 
Judicial Quality. Journal of Legal Studies, 15, p. 417; Posner, R.A. (1992). Economic Analysis of  
Law, 4th. ed., Boston-Toronto-London: Litle Brown and Company, p. 14.
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c) In cases where the domestic court before passing a judgement or before 
passing a preliminary ruling examines thoroughly and interprets properly 
the relevant part of the EC law according to the CILFIT standard (optimal 
standardization of application of the EC law), then value of case (V3) holds 
as follows:
V3 = p(1 – α)v – [(1 – p)βγD] – Ci (III)
Let us assume  that the standard liability adopted within the Community 
law is based on no liability rule, which means that γ=0, then:
pv > p(1 – α)v – Ci, consecutively V2 > V3 (IV)
and
pv > v – Cd, hence V2 > V1 (V)
The potential cost of judicial error does not influence the expected value of a 
ruling in case when the national court initiates preliminary reference pro-
cedure and also when the judgement is given independently by the court 
without examining it using the CILFIT standard. According to the assump-
tion about the judicial behaviour, the court will tend to adopt the strategy 
b), which means that courts will  avoid any preliminary references in any 
forms; with or without detailed examination of the EC law. Thus, the na-
tional court would adopt cheap and weak standardization (strategy c). This 
might be the best justification for the adoption of the principle of state liabil-
ity in case of judicial error in a form adopted by the ECJ in Köbler and Tra-
ghetti cases, where γ>0 and γ<1. According to the ECJ’s decision in Köbler v.  
Republic  of  Austria,  (Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239) a Member State 
may be liable in damages for a national court’s serious misapplication of the 
EC law. The approach presented in Köbler has been repeated and reinforced 
in case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy, [2006] where the ECJ 
stated that any limitation of State liability on the part of the court has been 
found as contrary to Community law if such limitations were to lead to ex-
clusion  of  liability  of  the  Member  State  concerned in  other  cases  where 
a manifest  infringement  of  the applicable  law was committed.  Those de-
cisions create the normative background for the standardization of damages 
awarded in case of the infringement of the individual rights protected by 
the EC law.
2010] M. Golecki: The EMU within the Coasean Transactional Framework 79
3. MONETARY INTEGRATION AND
HARMONIZATION OF LIABILITY RULES IN THE EC LAW
The above analysis concentrated on the possibility of the indirect harmoniz-
ation of compensations due to monetary integration and the optimization of 
state liability for damages in the EU law. The harmonization of the liability 
rule and the liability standard may be regarded as a precondition for the 
further unification of compensation. It seems that such unification would be 
easier if the value of compensation was calculated in a single currency. The 
issue is especially relevant under the rule derived from the cases of Köbler 
and Traghetti which states that the court in the Member State has the power 
to assess the amount of compensation in the case of a breach of the EC law.16 
Even in the case of the preliminary reference procedure being applied in a 
given trial the ECJ has no power to decide on the amount of compensation. 
This means that the harmonization of compensation awarded in the case of 
judicial error in the EC law cannot be attained directly by legal instruments. 
If, however, the process of monetary integration brings about the cross-bor-
der harmonization of prices, with trade being the main vehicle of this pro-
cess.17 Such an integration could, under some conditions, have an impact on 
the practice of the assessment of damages by national courts. Those condi-
tions include at least two factors. 
Firstly, the harmonization of damages awarded by the courts could be 
successful, provided that there is an instrument of the unification of judicial 
practices in the case of application of the EC law. This condition is satisfied 
under the assumption that the national courts apply a homogeneous stand-
ard of liability for judicial error and additionally, they conform with the ho-
mogeneous standard of the selection of cases in which the preliminary ref-
erence procedure is to be implemented, involving the ECJ in the process of 
adjudication.
Secondly, the courts in different Member States should be able to com-
pare different judgments concerning relatively similar  circumstances.  Ac-
cording to the theory of transactional framework put forward by Coase, Ca-
labresi and Melamed, the alternative between property rules and liability 
rules may be explained as a choice between two, parallel allocative frame-
works.18 Property rules serve as a precondition for market transaction, in-
16 Ruffert, M. (2007). Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA in Liquidation v. Italian 
Republic, Judgment of The Court (Great Chamber) of 13 June 2006. Common Market Law Re-
view, 44, 479-500.
17 Rogoff,  K. (1996). The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle,  Journal of Economic Literature,  34, 
647-668; Goldberg, P., & Knetter M. (1997). Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have 
We Learned? Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 1243-1272.
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cluding international trade.19 Commodities, prices of which are to be har-
monized under the assumption of monetary union, should in fact be treated 
as bunches of rights,  established and protected by property rules.  Under 
those circumstances, monetary union not only leads to the homogeneity of 
prices in different Member States, but additionally it should lead to an in-
crease in the number of transactions. Actually the empirical findings prove 
this proposition.20 This observation leads to the conclusion, which generally 
concurring with the Coasian transaction costs approach. Monetary integra-
tion minimizes the level of transaction costs, enhancing trade, and also ex-
pands the borders of the market. The question arises about the influence of 
this process upon non-market allocation in the form of the application of li-
ability rules. Such a situation occurs if the potential defendant infringes the 
right  of  the potential  plaintiff  by virtue of  an involuntary taking.  Under 
those circumstances the damages awarded by the court in the course of lit-
igation simply supplement payments. Therefore, the compensation supple-
ments price. If, according to the transactional framework, the market trans-
action and litigation in tort cases should be treated as institutional alternat-
ives, then the question arises whether monetary integration could lead to 
the harmonization of damages in a way analogical to the harmonization of 
prices in the case of market transactions based on contractual liability. The 
potential effect of monetary integration could be discernible at least on two 
levels. 
The first one concerns the level of administrative (or litigation) costs in-
curred by the court. As Ayres points out: “(…) the costs of determining liab-
ility  rule damages and securing payment are far from trivial”.21 The har-
monization of prices should minimize the cost of private information about 
the  value  of  entitlement.  The  problem  of  the  evaluation  of  entitlement 
means that the society has to cover the cost of evaluation, being the equival-
ent of transaction cost in the case of the voluntary transfer of entitlement 
through the market. As Kaplow and Shavell observe: “the virtue of the liab-
ility rules is that they allow the state to harness information that the injurer 
naturally possesses”.22 If however the value of the same entitlement is to be 
18 Coase, R.H. (1988).  The Firm, The Market and the Law, Chicago and London, Chicago Uni-
versity Press. p. 133; Calabresi, G., & Melamed, A. D. (1972). Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. Harvard Law Review, 85, p. 1093.
19 Coase, R.H. (1988).  The Firm, The Market and the Law, Chicago and London, Chicago Uni-
versity Press, p. 104.
20 Rose, A. (2000). One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade, Economic Policy, 30, 7-33.
21 Ayres,  I.  (2005).  Optional  Law:  The  Structure  of  Legal  Entitlements,  Chicago  and London, 
Chicago University Press.
22 Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S. (1996). Property Rules versus Liability Rules, Harvard Law Review  
109, p. 713-716.
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expressed in different monetary units, the cost of the application of liability 
rules obviously rises. This finding is particularly important within the con-
text of judicial practices in the Member States. In the majority of European 
jurisdictions, the market price or other indexes such as average salary, the 
standardized price of service or the value of goods in genere in fact supple-
ment the more exhaustive methods of inquiry about the value of loss result-
ing from the infringement of rights. This means that the court which tends 
to minimize the administrative costs will not spend resources on a thorough 
investigation concerning the evaluation of entitlement by both parties. Both 
parties possess private information and both of them usually behave stra-
tegically; the potential ‘sellers’ – plaintiffs, tend to overestimate the value, 
whereas  the  potential  ‘buyers’  -  defendants  underestimate  the  value  of 
a given entitlement. Under those circumstances the court usually refers to 
an index of value at hand, usually the market price. Thus, the harmoniza-
tion of prices in different Member States due to monetary integration will 
inevitably lead to the minimization of the costs of the application of liability 
rules in EC law.
The second level concerns the effect analogical to the harmonization of 
prices, namely the harmonization of damages awarded by different courts 
in the case of a similar infringement of the EC law. In the case of rights pro-
tected by the EC law, such as the right to a retirement bonus in Köbler or the 
right not to be discriminated with respect to state aid for some entrepren-
eurs as in  Traghetti, the breach of the EC law by a Member State, be it ad-
ministration, administrative or any other court depriving the subject of his 
or her right, could be interpreted through the lens of transactional frame-
work, as an attempt at an involuntary taking. In other words the infringe-
ment of the EC law could be interpreted as if the Member State attempted to 
carry out an involuntary taking of a given right. The compensation awarded 
due to the fact, that the illegal action of the Member State constituted an in-
fringement of a right resulting with a loss, might therefore be interpreted as 
the price of such an entitlement. The question arises, how should the court 
asses this value? Intuitively, the same right established and protected by the 
EC law throughout all  Europe should have at least similar,  if  not equal, 
value in all Member States.23 It is however not the case, since different na-
tional courts estimate the amount of damages according to national rules 
and use different  indexes  as  potential  points  of  reference.24 This  practice 
23 van Gerven, W. (1995). Bridging the Gap between Community and National Laws: Towards 
a Principle of Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies. Common Market Law Review, 32, 
679-702.
24 Chalmers, D. Hadjiemmanuil, C., Monti, G., Tomkins, A. (2006). European Union Law. Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
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stands in sharp opposition to both the EC law and the assumptions of the 
transactional  framework as  proposed  by  law and economics  scholars.  It 
does not mean however that monetary integration could not be effective on 
this second level. Hence, the opposite seems to be true. The theory of the 
transactional framework states that the parallel character of market and non 
market transfer must lead to the harmonization of damages if the harmoniz-
ation of prices  takes place.  Since the market  value and thus the price  of 
a given entitlement serves as a basic point of reference for national courts 
awarding damages,  monetary integration will  affect  the amount of  com-
pensation in the long run, under the condition that the judges are able to in-
quire about the verdicts of other courts in other jurisdictions. This process 
seems to be inevitable if the courts lean towards avoiding the infringement 
of the EC law, because the application of the EC law in other Member States 
play an important role, especially within the context of the CILFIT standard 
and the principle of ‘acte claire’ and ‘acte eclaire’ in the EC law, according to 
which the domestic court should be familiar with the verdicts of other na-
tional courts.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper the theory of transactional framework has been reconstructed 
within the light of the theory of monetary integration and applied to the 
analysis of the economic and legal consequences of the development of the 
European system of judicial governance. It seems that the principle of state 
liability for judicial error in the EC law creates institutional background for 
the harmonization of damages awarded by national courts throughout the 
European Union. Under the assumption that the process of the European 
monetary  integration  brings  about  cross-border  harmonization  of  prices, 
with the trade being the main vehicle of the process,  such an integration 
could, under some conditions, have an impact on the practice of assessment 
of  damages  awarded  by  national  courts.  Those  conditions  include  two 
factors. Firstly, the harmonization of damages awarded by the courts could 
be successful, provided that there is an instrument of unification of judicial 
practices in case of application of the EC law. Secondly, the courts in differ-
ent Member States should be able to compare different judgments concern-
ing  the  relatively  similar  circumstances.  The  theory  of  the  transactional 
framework stipulates that under those assumptions the parallel character of 
the market and non market transfer must in the long run lead to the har-
monization of damages awarded by the national courts if the harmonization 
of prices takes place. Those findings could be implemented to the evalu-
ation of the present development of the EU law. It seems that the policy dir-
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ection adopted by the European Commission in the recently adopted White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules COM (2008) and 
the judgments of the ECJ in  Köbler v. Republic of Austria and  Traghetti  del  
Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy cases comply with the assumptions of the transac-
tional framework theory and facilitate the influence of the monetary integ-
ration upon the EU legal framework.
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